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Abstract 
In the past 30 years, organised crime has shifted from being an issue of little, or no concern, to being 
considered one of the key security threats facing the European Union, the economic and political fabric 
of its society and its citizens. The purpose of this article is to understand how OC has come to be 
understood as one of the major security threats in the EU, by applying different lenses of Securitization 
Theory (ST). More specifically, the research question guiding this article is whether applying different 
Securitization Theory approaches can lead us to draw differing conclusions as to whether organised 
crime has been successfully securitised in the European Union. Building on the recent literature that 
argues that this theoretical framework has branched out into different approaches, this article wishes to 
contrast two alternative views of how a security problem comes into being, in order to verify whether 
different approaches can lead to diverging conclusions regarding the same phenomenon. The purpose 
of this exercise is to contribute to the further development of Securitization Theory by pointing out that 
the choice in approach bears direct consequences on reaching a conclusion regarding the successful 
character of a securitization process. Starting from a reflection on Securitization Theory, the article 
proceeds with applying a 'linguistic approach' to the case- study, which it then contrasts with a 
'sociological approach'. The article proposes that although the application of a ‘linguistic approach 
seems to indicate that organised crime has become securitised in the EU, it also overlooks a number of 
elements, which the ‘sociological approach’ renders visible and which lead us to refute the initial 
conclusion.  
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 Since the 80s, there has been an impressive evolution in the understanding of 
organised crime (OC), which has come to be viewed as one of the main threats facing the 
European Union (EU)’s internal security. Over the last 30 years, this understanding of 
OC as a very serious security threat has gradually become engrained in both EU and 
national discourses, resulting in a large array of measures, shaping the way Europe deals 
with this phenomenon. It is currently perceived as one of the main threats facing the 
European Union, in particular the security and the quality of life of its citizens, as well as 
the functioning of the internal market and of democratic institutions. Such perception is 
based on the rationale that organised crime groups have become transnational, operating 
easily across borders thanks to technological advances, facilitated communication among 
criminals, improved transport systems, and increased globalization. This rationale is 
further reinforced by the understanding that the development of the EU’s internal market, 
and the subsequent disappearance of intra- EU borders, has opened the door to the abuse 
of freedom of circulation by criminals. On this basis, the EU has proposed that member 
states do not have the capacity to counter such threat individually, and that a coordinated 
EU-level response is essential to a successful reduction in organised crime. Accordingly, 
the EU has been stepping up its efforts to counter this phenomenon by expanding its 
initiatives to cover as many forms of organised crime as possible, including drug 
smuggling, trafficking of Human Beings, cybercrime, counterfeiting, money laundering, 
piracy, trafficking in firearms, and smuggling of goods, among others. Such efforts have 
included the development of Action Plans to tackle drug supply and demand reduction, 
the approximation of national crime definitions, the adoption of tougher rules against 
trafficking of people, the promotion of EU-wide standards on freezing, confiscating and 
recovering organised crime proceeds, the gathering of comparable crime statistics, and 
the creation of specialised agencies responsible for the coordination of member states’ 
national authorities.  
 
Bearing this background in mind, the purpose of this article is to understand how 
OC has come to be understood as one of the major security threats in the EU, by applying 
different lenses of Securitization Theory (ST). More specifically, the research question 
guiding this article is whether applying different Securitization Theory approaches can 
lead us to draw differing conclusions as to whether organised crime has been successfully 
securitised in the European Union. Building on the recent literature that argues that this 
theoretical framework has evolved into different and separate strands, this reflection will 
rest on two diverging approaches - the ‘linguistic approach’ and the ‘sociological’ one 
(Balzacq 2011). As will be further explained in the body of the text, the ‘linguistic 
approach’ focuses on the discursive practices of securitizing actors2, namely speech acts, 
which underline the existential nature of threats (Buzan et al. 1998). The ‘sociological 
approach’, on the other hand, highlights the characteristics of the contexts in which these 
discoursive practices take place, as well as the daily non- discoursive practices of all the 
actors present in those given contexts (Bigo 2006). The purpose of this exercise is to 
explore the possibility that different views on how securization occurs can lead to 
dissimilar conclusions regarding the success or failure of a given securitization process.  
 
The article starts by discussing, in the first section, the application of ST to 
organised crime, the existing literature gap in this specific area and the proposed 
contribution of this piece. The text then proceeds by considering, in the second section, 
the ‘linguistic approach’, which points to the idea that there has been a clear shift of the 
EU from the position of securitization importer to the position of securitizing actor. 
Applying a ‘linguistic approach’ will lead us to consider the possibility that OC has been 
successfully securitized, through an incremental sequence of speech acts. An alternative 
analysis, however, will quickly reveal a much more complex reality in the third and final 
section of the article. By contrasting a ‘sociological approach’ with the ‘linguistic 
approach’, a number of non- discursive elements are rendered visible, indicating that 
there is a discrepancy between the framing of OC as an existential threat and the 
implementation of that framing, including the routine practices involved in such 
implementation. The non-discursive elements acquire relevance in the sense that they 
indicate that the audience at national level has not entirely accepted the securitizing 
move. From this perspective, the process appears less linear and the successful character 
of the securitization is put into question.  
 
                                                
2 According to the Copenhagen School, securitizing actors are those entities which are in a position to 
produce securitization moves - a claim regarding the survival of a referent object and the need for 
extraordinary measures to ensure its continuity and tackle an existential threat. Securitizing actors are 
usually equated with political actors (Buzan et al. 1998).  
Reflecting on the concept of organised crime and on its potential understanding 
through the theoretical lenses of Securitization Theory 
 
 One of the theoretical frameworks that has been most widely used in recent 
years to analyse how objects are framed in security terms is Securitization Theory, as 
developed by the Copenhagen School. According to the latter, an issue becomes a 
security problem when it is framed, through security language, “as an existential 
threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal 
bounds of political procedure” (Buzan et al. 1998: 24). The Copenhagen School has 
labelled this security utterance a ‘speech act’, through which a given object is 
presented in such a way as to be considered to threaten the survival of an object.  
 
As it has become apparent from the growing literature surrounding this 
framework, ST has been recurrently used to explain how phenomena such as 
migration, climate change, diseases, energy, borders and terrorism, among other, have 
come to be understood (or not) as security threats (Léonard and Kaunert forthcoming, 
Trombetta 2011, Bourbeau 2011, Huysmans 2006). With a few exceptions, however, 
OC has rarely featured as a case-study for securitization (for exceptions, please see 
Stritzel 2012, 2007, Jackson 2006). To be more precise, although it is possible to find 
the concept of securitization referred to in works dedicated to OC, such association is 
usually loosely framed and does not engage with ST itself (Mitsilegas 2003, 
Mitsilegas et al. 2003, Emmers 2002).  
 
This literature gap is particularly surprising given how OC features as the 
number one identified threat to EU internal security - followed by terrorism -
(Commission, 2010), and given its characterisation as “undermin[ing] the values and 
prosperity of our open societies” (Council 2010: 2). Currently, the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice constitutes the second most important objective of the EU 
(following the maintaining of peace), which focuses on providing those living within 
the EU with a secure environment (Treaty of Lisbon 2009). Within this context, the 
fight against organised crime has, thus, achieved an unprecedented level of political 
priority. Furthermore, the gap in the literature is equally surprising if we consider the 
attention provided to migration and terrorism in securitization studies and how 
migration, terrorism and OC have come to be understood as interrelated within an 
internal ‘security continuum’ (Bigo 1996).   
 
The reasons for this gap are manifold, including the difficulty in 
conceptualising OC, a general lack of interest on the part of International Relations 
and Critical Security Studies in this empirical field, and the limited success, on the 
part of these subjects, in exporting ST to other disciplines more traditionally involved 
in the study of OC, such as Criminology or Law. It is important to underline, at this 
stage, that there are authors working from an International Relations’ perspective who 
focus on organised crime among other security- related issues. It is the case, in 
particular, of the rapidly growing literature on the external dimension of Justice and 
Home Affairs, which explores the responses of EU member states and their 
neighbours to OC as transnational threat (Longo 2013, Irrera 2013, Carrapico 2013, 
Smith 2003). Such studies, however, remain considerably limited in number when 
compared to other security areas. Where the securitization of OC is concerned 
specifically, studies such as the ones by Stritzel (2012, 2007) and Jackson (2006) have 
applied ST as an analytical tool to study actors’ discursive practices, their framing of 
OC in a security lexicon and the consequences of such security embedded responses. 
With the exception of these works, however, limited attention has been paid to the 
consequences of applying different ST approaches and to the elements contributing to 
the success or failure of securitization. It is in this space that the present article wishes 
to insert itself. 
 
Whereas most works still seem to assume that ST corresponds to a cohesive 
theoretical framework, recent securitization literature has revealed a number of 
competing understandings of what securitization entails (Balzacq 2011). For the 
purpose of this article, I will only discuss the two main ones. On the one hand, there is 
the original interpretation of the Copenhagen School (CS), also known as the 
‘linguistic approach’ that argues that an actor can transform an object into a security 
threat by discursively framing it in security terms. More specifically, securitization 
occurs through the issuing of ‘speech acts’ that highlight the existential nature of a 
given issue (which is perceived to threaten the survival of a referent object, such as 
the State for example) and call for the use of extraordinary means to counter such 
threat (Waever 1995). The issue is considered to be successfully securitized if the 
issue comes to be understood as an existential threat and if the proposed extraordinary 
measures are accepted by an audience (Balzacq 2011). On the other hand, it is 
possible to identify a ‘sociological approach’, which emerged as a reaction to the 
CS’s proposal that securitization is a process solely associated to language. The 
‘sociological approach’ defends, instead, that securitization can occur through both 
discursive and non-discursive practices, such as bureaucratic and administrative 
routines, usage of technology and techniques (Stritzel 2012, 2007, Huysmans 2011). 
As a result, this approach claims that the analysis of utterances and their performative 
nature can only provide a partial view of a securitization process, and that a complete 
view also needs to include the analysis of the practices following such utterances and 
of the contextual conditions enabling them (Balzacq, 2011, Balzacq et al. 2010). It 
also argues that shifting our attention from speech acts to practices (including both 
discoursive and non- discoursive) allows us to distance ourselves from the 
exceptionality of securitization and to focus on the daily routines that are at the basis 
of how security operates. The considerable differences between these two approaches 
have consequences for the way we operationalize our analyses of securitization 
processes, and ultimately, for whether we can consider them to have been successful 
or not. In order to examine whether ST can help us understand the evolution of OC as 
a security issue, sections two and three of this article will reflect on the application of 
these different approaches.  
 
Although some authors working on OC have also discussed whether 
securitization processes have succeeded or not (Jackson 2006), insufficient attention 
has been devoted to the methodology employed to reach such conclusion (Balzacq 
2011). In particular, little work has been carried out in terms of exploring which 
criteria or indicators can be used to justify success or failure claims. In view of 
countering this gap, the article will have recourse to discourse analysis and process-
tracing to explore the practices of the different actors in the field, the coherence (or 
absence of) between discursive and non- discursive practices, the social mechanisms 
and the turning points in the construction of OC as a very serious security threat. 
Regarding the indicators specifically, and basing itself on Bourbeau’s work (2011), 
this article wishes to justify its arguments by identifying institutional and practices’ 
indicators. The institutional ones regard the way OC is presented by the EU, its 
relevance within the EU’s agenda, its perceived level of threat, the amount of 
declarations and official acts that have been enacted on this topic over time, but also 
the absence of compliance or cooperation. The practices’ indicators focus on whether 
official acts have resulted in the development of instruments to counter OC, on how 
these instruments are being used, and whether they are producing results in terms of 
an increase in the number of arrests.  
 
Applying a ‘linguistic approach’ to the emergence and development of EU 
counter-organised crime policies  
 
 Following the idea that ST should not be understood as a unitary theoretical 
framework and that at least two main approaches can be distinguished, the second 
section of the article proposes to explore the application and limitations of the 
‘linguistic approach’. Methodologically, it will proceed by analysing the main 
international and European official documents in the area of OC, by paying particular 
attention to the justification for the creation of new legal texts and measures.  
 
An inherited security discourse: the EU as a securitization importer 
 
We do not need to go far back in time to find a period where Europe did not 
consider OC to be a security problem. Not only did the majority of European States 
understand it to be an external issue, they also had very different takes on what OC 
was (Fijnaut and Paoli 2004). This does not mean that they were crime-free, but rather 
that they did not conceive OC as being more serious or separate from other types of 
crime. Most European countries did not feel the need, up until the 1980s, to adopt 
legislation or specific instruments in this area.3 How can we, then, explain Europe’s 
shift from not understanding OC as a security threat, to being one of the regions with 
the highest amount of anti-organised crime initiatives a few decades later (Fijnaut and 
Paoli 2004: 633- 637)? This first section would like to explore the securitization of 
OC by the United States, and its subsequent exporting to Europe through the 
dissemination of norms and rules by international organizations.  
 
OC first became the object of serious political and academic debate in the 
United States in the 1930s (Woodiwiss 2003). It was mainly regarded as a growing 
                                                
3 In this context, Italy is most certainly an exception, having been the first European country to adopt 
legislation to counter OC, already in the mid-1960s (Mitsilegas 2003: 56-57). 
economic problem, stemming from the existence of public demand for illegal goods. 
This economic perspective would, however, quickly be replaced by a security one in 
the 1940s and 1950s, with OC being identified with immigrant-dominated groups, 
whose goal was understood as the corruption of society: “the tentacles of organized 
crime reach into virtually every community throughout the country” (US Senate 
1951a: 147). This change was very visible in public discourse, with the emphasis on 
reforming society being substituted with the need for stronger law enforcement and 
the imagery of warfare against OC (Von Lampe 2001). Between the 1930s and the 
1960s, it was possible to observe, in the United States, a securitization of OC, which 
would lead to its labelling as a very serious security threat, “a serious menace which 
[…] could wreck the very foundation of this country” (US Senate 1951c: 5). Such 
securitization process, taking the American society and values as its referent object, 
would eventually lead to the creation of special governmental bodies: “everywhere 
throughout the country citizens, […] have risen up to demand greater vigilance in 
stamping out crime and corruption” (US Senate 1951b: 2). This process, however, 
would remain confined to the United States for at least one more decade4.  
 
The situation gradually started to change with the United States’ attempts to 
externalise its concerns, through international organizations, such as the United 
Nations, or informal intergovernmental fora, such as the G8 (Stritzel 2012). In a first 
phase, the externalization strategy focused, not on OC groups directly, but on drug 
use and its perceived societal impact (Woodiwiss 2003). The United Nations’ 
Conventions in this area (1961, 1971, 1988) were particularly instrumental in the 
exporting of the securitization of OC, as we can observe a clear shift in the 
international conceptualisation of OC from an economic and health issue to a security 
problem (Scherrer 2009). The objective of the 1961 United Nations’ Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs was to protect the health and welfare of mankind by 
limiting the possession and abuse of narcotic substances, and by encouraging member 
states to cooperate in view of reducing drug trafficking (United Nations’ General 
Assembly 1961). Allusions to the latter, however, were unrelated to OC, which was 
entirely absent from the Convention. The 1971 United Nations’ Convention on 
Psychotropic Substances, on the other hand, already started to be symptomatic of a 
                                                
4 For a much more detailed account of the securitization process of organised crime in the US, please 
see Stritzel 2012. 
greater concern with organised criminality. By assuming in its preamble a direct 
correlation between drug abuse and the increase in illicit traffic, the Convention 
attributed a much greater role to the action against trafficking. When the Fourth 
United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders 
met to discuss crime prevention planning, direct references to OC began to appear, 
encouraged by reports from US Presidential Commissions (United Nations’ General 
Assembly 1970). The example of powerful networks of criminals engaged in a wide 
range of illicit activities was proposed to illustrate the evolution of criminality in a 
fast changing world. This trend would be confirmed during the following congress in 
1975, where extensive references to OC activities were made and the transnationality 
of crime was, for the first time, put on the agenda (United Nations’ General Assembly 
1975).  
 
These developments paved the way for the 1994 United Nations’ Conference 
on transnational OC, and led to the production of the first international Convention on 
this topic. Although this text is usually regarded as a turning point in the literature 
(Beare 2003), the prior escalation in security discourse shows that this was a long-
term process, in which different degrees of securitization were gradually achieved. If 
anything, the 1994 Convention represents formal evidence of the fact that the United 
States managed to export their conception of OC to the international level, which was 
accepted by all signatory countries. According to the Naples Political Declaration 
signed on that occasion, there is little doubt regarding the understanding of OC as an 
existential threat, “undermining the development process, impairing the quality of life 
and threatening human rights and fundamental freedoms” (United Nations’ General 
Assembly 1994: 1). The success of the securitization process at international level is 
further demonstrated by the implementation of urgent measures: the strengthening 
and improvement of cooperation among States, and an expansion of law enforcement 
powers, presented as the most adequate tool in face of such a powerful challenge 
(United Nations’ General Assembly 1994). Such initiatives were not limited to the 
United Nations, but were also promoted by a number of other international bodies and 
organizations, such as the TREVI Group, the G8 and the Council of Europe, which 
gradually adopted similar agendas in relation to OC (Scherrer 2009, Bunyan 1993).  
 
By the 1980s, this international understanding of OC as a serious security 
concern had also started to pervade the European context (European Parliament 
2011a). During this period, we can observe a creeping securitization of OC in Europe, 
with specific countries demonstrating a greater awareness of this phenomenon, 
influenced not only by the mediatisation of the American debate, but also by the 
activities of organisations such as the Council of Europe and the Trevi Group (Fijnaut 
1987; Council of Europe 1985: 96). The Stoffelen Report, published in 1986, on 
international organised crime, trafficking in drugs and in persons was particularly 
instrumental in creating awareness of this issue in Europe (Council of Europe 1986). 
This creeping securitization enabled not only for the sense of urgency in dealing with 
OC to expand to a new geographical area, but also for the number of securitizing 
actors to increase as well. Member states, such as Germany and Italy, were 
increasingly adopting this security concern, which was initially limited to national 
discourse, but rapidly evolved into attempts to upload it to the EC level (Fijnaut and 
Paoli 2004; Von Lampe 2001). The heterogeneity in European understandings of OC 
would gradually start to fade. This process was marked by two important shifts: a 
change from counter- OC efforts at the national level to the European one (Den Boer 
2002), and a move of the European Community (EC) from a position of securitization 
importer to a position of securitizing actor. As this section will point out, both shifts 
were mainly induced by the completion of the single market and, subsequently, of the 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). 
 
The development of a securitization process within the EU: from a securitization 
importer to a securitizing actor 
 
Although we can observe an expansion in the securitization of OC from the 
international level to specific EC member states, this process did not immediately 
reflect itself at European level. Similarly to the United Nations, it made its way to the 
EC through a process of association, through drug abuse and its related health risks 
understood to be “threatening to submerge Europe in the short term” (European 
Commission 1984: 4). The new trend that emerges during this period is the EC’s 
perception of the need to demonstrate its support to international organizations active 
in this area, such as the United Nations and the Council of Europe. Although there 
was, at the time, no intention of replacing these organizations in the fight against 
drugs, the EC considered “specific action […] essential, in view of the fact that the 
efforts of the individual Member States to combat illicit drugs have so far failed to 
produce the desired results” (European Commission 1986: 5). Thus, during the early-
1980s, we can observe, not only an acceptance of the securitization of drugs on the 
part of the EC, but also a timid attempt to contribute to the general securitization 
process by reiterating international organizations’ discourse. This situation, however, 
remained limited to the specific field of drugs, as no direct correlation with OC 
seemed to be established.  
 
In the mid-1980s, we start to see a transition from a health perspective to a law 
enforcement one: “there is every need to improve and intensify international 
collaboration, particularly as regards the production and traffic in drugs” (European 
Council 1986: 6). This transition would mainly be accelerated by the willingness to 
complete the Single Market, but also by an approximation between the US 
government and EC ministers, which included the participation of US representatives 
in EC ministers’ meetings as observers and the training of European police officers by 
the FBI  (Fijnaut 1990). With the expected abolition of internal borders in 1992, 
preparations were initiated, with the signature of the Schengen Agreement, to ensure 
that any potential negative externality stemming from the disappearance of frontiers 
would be compensated for. The logic associated to the compensatory measures 
assumed that the disappearance of internal borders would inevitably lead to an 
increase in crime, and consequently, to a greater challenge for law enforcement 
bodies: “the Commission shares the legitimate concerns of the member states about 
the need to control drugs and terrorism and is well aware of the role of internal 
frontier posts in this respect” (European Commission 1985: 12). Such dominant 
discourse marked the emergence of an internal security agenda, and opened the door 
to the introduction of the concept of OC in the European lexicon. Examples of such 
discourse include, for example, urgent calls, from the EC, for more cooperation 
among member states’ police forces to tackle organised crime (Fijnaut 1987), the 
proposal to create in 1985 a TREVI working group dedicated exclusively to analysing 
the threat stemming from organised crime (Bunyan 1993), and the proposal in 1991 to 
create a European police office (European Council 1991). This functionalist logic 
would serve as the basis for the process of securitization of organised crime at the EC 
level: 
 
“One thing leads to another. This has been a feature of the Community, which 
is constantly being taken into new areas. […] I am referring, of course to the 
consequences of free movement of individuals and the need for joint action, or at least 
close co- ordination, to combat these various threats to personal security: organized 
crime, drug trafficking, terrorism” (Delors 1991: 103). 
 
In 1990, the compensatory measures were further elaborated on with the 
signing of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, which focused 
strongly on crime repression and prevention. The Convention was ground breaking, as 
it paved the way for innovative law enforcement cooperation and stimulated the 
multiplication of instruments in the area of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). Although 
no explicit mention of OC was made in the Convention, it is worth noticing the 
continued concern expressed with drug trafficking. The first official reference to 
organised crime in the EC discourse would only be made in 1991, with the proposal 
to set up a ‘Central European Criminal Investigation Office’, stemming out of 
Germany’s concern with this phenomenon (Fijnaut 1993); a concern that was rapidly 
extending to other member states and acquiring emergency contours, “considering the 
urgent problems posed by international illicit drug trafficking, associated money 
laundering and organised crime” (Ministerial Agreement on the establishment of 
Europol Drugs Unit 1993: 1). Furthermore, the Treaty of the European Union 
formally acknowledged the need for the EU to have a JHA Pillar and to act in the 
prevention and combat of organised crime, presenting it as a matter of common 
interest. Such recognition paved the way for the EU to start recurrently addressing the 
issue of organised crime. A clear example was the transformation of the Europol 
Drugs Unit into Europol and the continuous enlargement of its mandate, a change 
deemed necessary in view of the expanding security problem: “Organized crime has 
developed in Europe and worldwide at an alarming speed. The establishment of 
Europol is the response of the European Union” (Storbeck cited in Santiago 2000: 
foreword).  
 
A number of external events also played an important role in the development 
of the EU’s securitization of OC. It was the case, in particular, of the assassinations of 
the Italian Judges Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino, which led national 
governments to call for the creation, in September 1992, of the first body exclusively 
dedicated to OC, the Ad Hoc Group on Organised Crime (Fijnaut and Paoli 2004: 
633-634). The recommendations of the Ad Hoc Group on Organised Crime and the 
enthusiastic beginnings of Europol, however, did not seem to be sufficient to push the 
EU to develop a more cohesive programme to counter this issue. The incentive would 
come in the form of Veronica Guerin’s assassination in 1996, a journalist who would 
frequently write on Irish OC (Fijnaut and Paoli 2004: 634). The public awareness 
surrounding the event prompted Ireland, which was holding the Presidency of the 
Union at the time, to propose the upgrading of the Ad Hoc Group to a High- Level 
Group on Organised Crime (European Council 1996). The latter was asked to prepare 
the first EU action plan on organised crime, which contained political guidelines and 
specific recommendations. Not only did it clearly reinforce the shift from national 
counter- organised crime efforts to a European one, but also marked a higher degree 
in the process of securitization through the labelling of organised crime as an 
existential threat: “Organized crime is increasingly becoming a threat to society as we 
know it and want to preserve it” (Council 1997: 1). Organized crime was no longer 
considered as a simple obstacle to the Single Market. Rather, it was equated with 
having obtained the capacity to economically, socially, and politically destabilize the 
EU. 
 
Throughout the 1990s, we saw organised crime gradually becoming 
securitised, leading to the development of counter- organised crime bodies, legal 
instruments and law enforcement cooperation measures. Since then, the EU’s 
discourse on organised crime has essentially remained unchanged: “organised crime 
[…] is among the key threats to the internal security of the EU and the freedom of its 
citizens” (European parliament 2011b). It has mainly continued to develop in the 
direction of further justifying the prioritization and expansion of EU activities in this 
area, which it has done so through a number of interconnected paths. 
 
Firstly, it has continued to underline the exponential growth of organized 
crime activities and the role played by political, economic, social, legal and 
technological factors in facilitating such growth. The disappearance of internal 
borders, the drastic globalization of the world economy, the increase in citizens’ 
mobility, the fragmented national criminal legislations, and the fast- developing 
technological advances are presented as having accelerated the OC disruption of 
healthy economies, democratic systems and citizen’s lives (Council 2000a).  
 Secondly, this emotionally charged discourse has allowed the EU to continue 
to justify its advantage as a large and overseeing body in tackling this problem: “the 
threat of national and international organised crime requires concerted action by the 
Member States, and by the European Union itself” (Council 2000a: 3). The 
understanding that OC is not country specific, but represents a European threat, has 
equally led the EU to focus on developing a common classification of criminal 
organization. This large definition, which the EU considers essential to approximate 
member states’ understandings of this phenomenon, as well as their national 
legislations (Council 1997, Council 1998) has been gradually enlarged with new types 
of crimes, which is particularly visible in the 2009 Europol Council Decision  
(Council 2009). Since the 2008 Framework Agreement, the EU has defined criminal 
organization as a ‘structured association, established over time, of more than two 
persons acting in concert with a view to committing offences which are punishable by 
deprivation of liberty or a detention order of a maximum of at least four years […] to 
obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit’ (Council 2008: Art. 
1). Within the justification for preferential action at EU level, it has also become clear 
that there has been a move, from an argument associated to the protection of the 
single market, to an argument based on the protection of the citizens’ themselves and 
the completion of the AFSJ: “people have the right to expect the European Union to 
address the threat to their freedom and legal rights posed by serious crime” (Council 
2000a: 1).  
 
Thirdly, this discursive basis has enabled the EU to gradually expand the 
coherence of its counter-OC efforts through both political and legal instruments. 
Among the political ones, we can find more consistent programmes, action plans and 
policy cycles aimed at developing a fully- fledged policy in this area (Council 2010; 
Council 2000a). Among the legal ones, the EU has adopted an impressive number of 
Council Decisions, Framework Decisions and Joint Actions to ensure the 
approximation, and to a certain extent harmonization, of member states’ legislations 
(Calderoni 2010: 8-9). The EU has also greatly increased the number of bodies and 
agencies focusing on police and judicial cooperation, which equally contribute to the 
development of policies in this area. It is the case of the European Judicial Network, 
Eurojust, OLAF, future European Public Prosecutor and, indirectly, FRONTEX.  
 Finally, the last path that can be identified is related to a spillover from the 
AFSJ onto the EU’s foreign relations (Longo 2013, Irrera 2013, Carrapico 2013, 
Smith 2003). The EU is currently exporting its understanding of OC beyond its 
borders, which it justifies on the basis of the need to cooperate with non- EU 
countries to ensure the coherence of EU efforts against an ever-more transnational 
OC: “The development of the area of freedom, security and justice can only be 
successful if it is underpinned by a partnership with third countries” (Council 2005). 
As an example, we can recall the EU Action Plan on Common Action for the Russian 
Federation on Combating Organised Crime (2000).  
 
 The application of a ‘linguistic approach’ has led us to look at how this issue 
has been linguistically framed in the EU discourse over the years. This analysis 
pointed to the idea that the securitization of OC has been imported into the EU from 
the United States and international fora, having gradually become transversal to the 
main actors in the field. The result of such evolving process has culminated in an 
existential discourse depicting OC as a common and increasingly dangerous enemy, 
which has enabled the establishment of specific structures, mechanisms and 
instruments encouraging internal security authorities to cooperate. From this 
perspective, one could argue that we are observing a case of successful securitization, 
in particular given that there is no noticeable resistance to the European Union’s 
mainstream discourse on OC from any audience. 
 
 
Applying a ‘sociological approach’ to counter-organised crime policies in the 
European Union 
 
There are, however, problematic aspects to the ‘linguistic approach’. The 
remainder of the article would like to explore one of the main ones, namely the idea 
that a focus on the discursive practices of the EU could have the potential to overlook 
signs of non- acceptance within the securitization process. From a linguistic 
perspective, the securitization of OC appears to be a fairly linear process of language 
contagion, where all the actors in the field have gradually adopted the same 
understanding of this phenomenon as a security threat. However, if we apply a 
‘sociological approach’ instead, elements which were previously invisible become 
observable. Non-discursive elements, which may indicate a form of non- acceptance 
of the securitization process and which may render its evolution much less 
straightforward, become part of the process as well. This third and last section will 
look at two examples that point to the idea that national audiences have not been 
entirely convinced by the securitization moves: the absence of practical 
implementation of the EU’s understanding of OC on the part of national governments 
and an analysis of the lack of cooperation between national governments and Europol. 
Although both the absence of practical implementation and the lack of cooperation 
may stem from a range of different factors, such as institutional incompatibilities or 
diverging work practices, it is expected that a successful securitization process would 
be sufficiently convincing as to motivate the different actors in the field to attempt to 
overcome such obstacles. The purpose of both examples is to demonstrate that the 
lack of acceptance, independently from whether it is active or passive, leads to a 
difference between what is being communicated through discursive practices and 
what is taking place in non-discursive practices. Given this discrepancy, can we still 
consider OC to be successfully securitized in the EU? 
 
Absence of practical implementation 
 
 There is little doubt that the EU’s understanding of OC has been accepted, as a 
very serious security threat by the actors in this field. From EU institutions to national 
governments, there seems to be a shared willingness and sense of urgency in tackling 
this issue, which is discursively expressed. However, if we look beyond the discursive 
dimension, we will notice that the implementation of measures at the local level does 
not always reflect this understanding. Although comparative studies on the 
applicability of EU instruments on OC at national level and their effectiveness are still 
tentative, one can notice three relevant trends: the first one is that most EU countries 
do comply with EU legislation in this area. The remaining two trends, however, seem 
to clash with the first one. The second trend points to the idea that there is still a 
considerable degree of disparity among national legal frameworks (Calderoni 2010). 
This disparity is most relevant in terms of the type of predicate offences, the length in 
the continuity of criminal organizations and the variety in penalties. These legal 
specificities are pertinent, as they become symptomatic of non-acceptance of the 
securitization process, causing friction in the development of a common approach to 
organised crime. This argument does not aim to propose that the difficulty, for 
example, in approximating national legislations is due to any form of active resistance 
to the EU’s securitization of organised crime, but that a successful securitization 
would automatically imply a greater impetus towards approximation. The third trend 
consists in a discrepancy between the objective of OC legislations and their achieved 
results. Although a considerable number of individuals are arrested every year for 
criminal offenses, such as drug trafficking or weapon smuggling, if we compare this 
figure with the number of people convicted for their involvement in organised crime, 
the latter is surprisingly very low (XXXX 2010).  
 
Thus, if the EU’s understanding of OC has been well accepted, how can we 
explain the existence of such disparities? The answer to this question does not lay in a 
dispute over the degree of dangerousness posed by OC, but in a disagreement over 
what the concept of OC signifies. Despite numerous attempts to develop common 
definitions, the EU’s classification has remained extremely vague. Given the degree 
of difficulty in defining the concept of organised crime and as mentioned in section 
two of this article, the EU has chosen to focus, instead, on the figure of criminal 
association. The definition provided by the 2008 Framework Decision on the fight 
against OC is problematic in the sense that it sheds little light into what constitutes a 
criminal organization, and even less where the concept of organised crime is 
concerned (Council 2008: Art. 1) (for the exact definition, please see section two of 
this article). It provides no specific indication of the level of organization necessary 
for a group to be classified as such, nor does it refer to how long the association needs 
to be in existence for. From this perspective, it is not a functional definition, as it 
opens the door to the inclusion of phenomena a different as the Italian ‘Ndrangheta, a 
group of hooligans or a teenage street gang.  
 
The risk associated to maintaining such a large definition is that the concept 
might become an empty signifier. There are also legal consequences, in particular for 
the clarity, precision and legal certainty of the measures adopted (European 
Parliament 2009, Mitsilegas 2003). In order to be able to operationalize this European 
definition, national legislators often have had to be more precise by adding their own 
interpretation. Given that the EU instruments provided them with such freedom, the 
end result has been a rather large diversity in the implementation of the concept of 
OC, which is likely to affect its general understanding. In this first example of a 
‘sociological approach’, although there is no indication of opposition to the EU’s 
understanding of OC as a security threat, the discrepancy between the rhetoric and its 
implementation has pointed towards the existence of a lack of acceptance (involuntary 
or not), which leads us to question the successful character of its securitization.  
 
The lack of cooperation between Europol and member states: the case of organised 
crime reports 
 
This last part of the third section attempts to provide another example of a 
situation where non-discursive elements are contributing to the non-acceptance of the 
OC securitization process, by analysing the lack of cooperation on the side of member 
states in the development of Europol reports on organised crime.  
 
The idea to create a system of reports on OC in Europe originated in the 
Luxembourg European Council in 1991. The German delegation wanted to foster the 
creation of a ‘Central European Criminal Investigation Office’, which would be able 
to collect, analyse and exchange information (Den Boer and Bruggeman 2007). The 
European Council considered this project a priority, although little was mentioned 
regarding the information to be collected. The reports were kick-started with the Ad 
Hoc Group on Organised Crime’s official proposal to set up a common mechanism 
for the collection and systematic analysis of information in this area (Council 1993). 
The purpose of such mechanism was to provide member states with a bird’s eye view 
of on- going trends in OC, enabling them to make more informed decisions 
concerning their national policies. The data of the first two ‘Organised Crime 
Situation Reports’ (1994 and 1995) was gathered through a questionnaire, directed at 
national administrations, inquiring on the extent of OC in their country (Vander 
Beken 2006). The Presidency would then collect the received answers and compile 
them into one single report. However, it became clear from the first report that, not 
only was there a substantial disparity in terms of the countries’ understandings of OC, 
there was also a large discrepancy in the quality and quantity of national contributions 
(Van der Heijden 1996). The second report showed little improvement as only six out 
of the fifteen countries actually provided data for the report.  
 Member States’ initial hesitation in cooperating can be explained by a number 
of reasons. Law enforcement bodies felt that they were unfamiliar with these 
instruments and unsure of how these would assist them in dealing with local 
problems: “when it comes to operational police co-operation, member states prefer to 
co- operate on a bilateral basis, with us of the ‘old boys network’ of police officers 
worldwide” (Den Boer and Bruggman 2007: 11).  In addition, the circulation of the 
reports was, at the time, still very limited, which meant that the large majority of law 
enforcement institutions was still unaware of their existence. Furthermore, it was not 
only a question of willingness but of availability, as the structure to collect specific 
data on OC was not in place in some of the member states. All these elements 
contributed to a poor turnout in terms of answers to the national questionnaires. If we 
consider that the reports were, at that time, completely dependent on the quality and 
quantity of the data supplied by member states, then the final product also reflected 
this poor quality. Furthermore, given that the figures provided by the countries were 
directly related to their local administrations and their understanding of OC, it was 
also clear that they were not comparable. This aggravating factor contributed to 
preventing the reports from initially acquiring a favourable reputation as reliable 
instruments, leading to a vicious circle of non- cooperation (Van der Heijden 1993).  
 
Having become aware of this problem, the Council attempted to improve the 
quality and recognition of the reports by developing a standardized mechanism for the 
preparation of national answers (Council 1993). Although no strict definition was 
provided for what OC meant, there was a clear attempt to start moulding member 
states’ understandings of the concept, through guidelines on which phenomena to 
include in the questionnaires and how statistics should be calculated. Such efforts 
were built in parallel with the growing perception that a common approach would be 
highly beneficial to the fight against OC. As a common approach would require a 
precise overview of the extent of the threat, the harmonization of national 
methodologies for the collection of information became a priority (Council 1997). For 
the 1998 report, a cross-checking mechanism was introduced with the purpose of 
improving the information quality, and by 2000, a set of formal guidelines for the 
collection, processing and analysis of the information had been put in place (Council 
2000b). These efforts yield positive results, as reports shifted from being considered 
plain aggregations of national information to being seen as analytical documents, and 
even full- fledged threat assessments, with added value for member states (Council 
2000a).  
 
However, if this shift is mostly visible at the level of European institutions, the 
same cannot be said about the national level. Despite there being a clear tendency 
towards the approximation of member states’ understandings of OC, and no vocal 
opposition to the role of the reports in this process, the flow of information has not 
entirely reflected this trend. National authorities continued to maintain a cautious 
approach to the reports, often preferring to exchange information bilaterally, with 
institutions they were more familiar with. In the mid-2000s, the House of Lords 
estimated that 80% of information exchange was taking place outside of Europol’s 
framework. It is also the case that law enforcement authorities have perceived 
Europol as a potential competitor and have had little desire to be relegated to the role 
of secondary actors (House of Lords 2008).  
 
Since 2006, with the introduction of a new model of report, the ‘Organised 
Crime Threat Assessment’, there seems to have been a gradual improvement in 
national contributions (Europol 2011). Nevertheless, the latter continue to be 
considerably uneven, with some countries handing in 500 page questionnaires and 
others one-page answers (Brady 2008). Given that data sharing is done on a voluntary 
basis and often depends on the decision of national police officers, the reports 
continue to have problematic aspects. This second example, therefore, indicates that 
the problematic cooperation on the side of member states has also been contributing 
towards the lack of acceptance of the OC securitization process. It indicates that 
although there seems to be an apparent acceptance of the reports and their importance 
for the fight against OC, the national level is not entirely convinced that it should 
prioritize these documents. Given the evolution in how the reports are perceived, we 
can consider that the securitization of OC has only been partial.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Despite the key importance that organised crime has come to assume within 
the EU’s security strategy, this is an issue that has rarely featured among 
Securitization studies. Unlike topics such as immigration, which are frequently used 
as successful examples of securitization processes, the EU’s approach to organised 
crime has so far not been denaturalised. Bearing this background in mind, the purpose 
of this article was two-fold: not only did it aim to expand the Securitization literature 
by providing an innovative case-study on EU organised crime threat perceptions, but 
it also proposed to contribute to this literature in methodological terms. Bearing in 
mind the theoretical developments within the Securitization framework, this article 
aimed at analysing whether applying different approaches to Securitization Theory 
could lead to alternative accounts of whether organised crime had been successfully 
securitized in the EU. The article started by applying a ‘linguistic approach’ to the 
case- study, which focused on the discursive practices of the EU and indicated that 
securitization had been successful. This approach pointed to the existence of a first 
shift from a counter-organised crime effort at national level to an EU one, and a 
second shift of the EU from a position as a securitization importer to a position as a 
securitizing actor. The first part of the text also suggested that securitization could be 
best understood, not as the result of an actor’s move, but as a long-term cumulative 
process constituted by the different discursive practices in the field. The ‘linguistic 
approach’ was then contrasted with a ‘sociological approach’, reorienting our 
attention to non- discursive practices and their potential role in the securitization 
process. By analysing two examples of non-discursive practices, it emerged that the 
‘linguistic approach’ conceals important elements, which are contributing to forms of 
non- acceptance of the securitization process. As was proposed in the last part of this 
article, although there seems to have been an approximation of the organised crime 
understandings, enabling for the emergence of a homogeneous discourse framing 
organised crime as an existential threat to the EU, there continues to be a disconnect 
between the rhetorical level and the level of non- discoursive practices. This 
disconnect indicates that the securitization process has not fully managed to convince 
national authorities of the need to take extra-ordinary measures to counter this 
phenomenon. It is, therefore, the conclusion of this article that organised crime has 
only been partly securitized in the EU, pointing to the development of this field as key 
in the future of this process.   
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